This paper provides new evidence on what types of individuals are most likely to choose a defined contribution (DC) plan over a defined benefit (DB) plan. Making use of administrative data from the State University Retirement System of Illinois, we study the decisions of nearly 50,000 new employees who make a one-time, irrevocable choice between a traditional DB plan, a portable DB plan, and an entirely self-managed DC plan. These state employees are not covered under the Social Security system, and thus this choice represents their preferences over the form of their primary source of retirement income, and as such, provides insight into what types of individuals might be most likely to opt for voluntary personal accounts as part of Social Security. We find that a majority of participants fail to make an active decision and are thus defaulted into the traditional DB plan after 6 months. We also find that those individuals who are most likely to be financially sophisticated, such as university professors, are most likely to choose the self-managed DC plan, despite the fact that this plan can be shown to be inferior to the portable DB plan along multiple dimensions. We attribute this to framing effects in how the plan choices are communicated to new employees.
Introduction
In recent years, numerous proposals have been forwarded to partially replace the defined benefits provided by Social Security with personal retirement accounts in the U.S. A key feature of many personal account proposals, including those of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security and that forwarded by President Bush in 2005, is that participation in personal accounts would be voluntary. Individuals would be given the opportunity to choose whether to redirect some of their existing payroll taxes away from the current system and into personal retirement accounts (PRAs).
Because they would be redirecting payroll taxes away from the existing program, their decision to participate in the personal accounts program would require that they give up the right to some portion of the traditional OASDI benefit, a feature that is commonly referred to as a "benefit offset." An interesting and difficult question is who would choose to participate in such a plan were it to be offered.
Understanding participation is of more than just academic interest. Participants in personal accounts would face a different risk and return profile of retirement benefits than would non-participants, and thus understanding who is most likely to participate might influence one's view of the individual welfare implications of reform. At an aggregate level, participation rates are a critical assumption in understanding the fiscal implications of Social Security reform proposals that involve a redirection of existing payroll tax revenue away from the Trust Funds and into personal accounts. For a given reform, high participation rates would increase the size of the "transition cost" that must be financed in the early years of a reform and would result in larger reductions in pay-as-you-go expenditures in future years.
When scoring reform proposals, the Social Security Office of the Chief Actuary typically handles this uncertainty by showing the financial implications of reform under several alternative assumptions, such as 100%, 67%, 50% and 0%. The uncertainty about participation rates was also apparent in the CBO's analysis of the President's FY 2007 budget, with the CBO estimated that approximately one-third of workers would sign up for the accounts under the President's plan, versus the two-thirds estimated in the President's Budget (CBO, 2006) .
As important as participation rates are, there is very little useful guidance in the literature on how to estimate them. Unfortunately, the very large literature on 401(k) participation rates is of only limited use because the alternative to participating is entirely different in a 401(k) than in most Social Security reform proposals. If one chooses not to participate in the 401(k), the alternative is to take the compensation in the form of taxable wages. In such a case, the main trade-off is between current and future consumption. In contrast, in Social Security plans with a benefit offset, the individual would face a trade-off between two alternative methods of financing future consumption. For example, according to President Bush's 2005 proposal, for every dollar that an individual redirected into a personal account, she would have been required to give up a benefit amount equal to the annuitized value of that one dollar contribution accumulated at a 3 percent real rate of interest. Thus, if an individual were to receive an average real rate of return on the personal account balances in excess of 3 percent, their retirement income would be higher due to having participated in the account. In contrast, if the individual's average real return fell below 3 percent, participation in the account would reduce retirement income. Thus, the decision of whether or not to participate in a Social Security PRA program has less to do with one's views about the relative value of consumption today versus in the future (which is the key decision in a 401(k) plan), and more to do with an individual's beliefs about expected financial market returns, mortality risk, financial and political risk, the value of choice, the value of inheritability, and so forth.
A better way to learn about potential participation rates in a PRA plan would be to analyze situations in which an individual worker has an explicit choice between a DB and a DC plan, holding job characteristics fixed. In most cases, however, individuals can only choose their pension type by choosing their employer and it is quite clear that a firm's pension plan is but one element in a whole vector of characteristics that vary across jobs and firms. Thus, one can never be sure that the decision to work for an employer that offers a 401(k) instead of an employer that offers a DB plan reflects characteristics of the pension as opposed to numerous other differences across the employers. Alternatively, one could attempt to determine the worker characteristics that correlate with valuing DC over DB by looking at firm's that switch pension type. Such plan conversions, however, may be driven more by firm level concerns, such as the costs of plan administration, than by employee preferences per se. Even if the cross-sectional variation in which firms choose to convert to a DC plan is correlated with employee preferences, it only tells us that some subset of employees valued this shift, not that all employees at the firm valued such a shift. Finally, in an ideal world, one would wish to examine the DB vs. DC choice in the absence of the confounding effects of the Social Security program itself. In most private sector plans, even if individuals were given a DB vs. DC choice, it would be for income that is above that which they expect to receive from Social Security in the first place. Given that the value of annuitization, for example, is a declining function of the fraction of wealth already annuitized, this may make individuals more likely to choose a DC if it is on top of the DB already provided by Social Security.
In this paper, we make use of a unique data set in which individuals are given an explicit choice between a DB and a DC plan, holding all job characteristics fixed. In the State University Retirement System (SURS) of Illinois, all employees are given the opportunity, in their first six months of employment, to make a one-time, lifetime, irrevocable choice among three retirement plans: (i) a traditional formula-based DB plan; (ii) a "portable DB plan," which is slightly less generous than the ordinary DB if one retires from the system, but more generous if they take an early lump-sum distribution; and (iii) the "Self-Managed Plan" or SMP, which is a 100 percent self-directed DC plan.
Individuals who fail to make an active choice within the first 6 months of employment are automatically defaulted into the traditional DB plan.
There are two particular features of the SURS environment which together make this decision particularly relevant. First, because Illinois is one of seven states that opted out of the Social Security system, 1 individuals who work for a SURS covered employer are not covered by Social Security, meaning that no OASDI payroll taxes are withheld and no OASDI benefits accrue based on these earnings. Thus, unless an individual has substantial employment earnings outside of the SURS system, it will be SURS and not Social Security that will provide the primary source of income in retirement.
Second, the combined employer/employee retirement contributions to the SURS system are, at minimum, 14.6 percent of annual salary, which is larger than the payroll tax paid by those in the Social Security system. Therefore, the SURS system looms large as part of any participant's lifetime financial plan.
Using administrative data on the full universe of SURS covered employees since the plan choice was first made available starting in 1998/99, we analyze what types of employees are most likely to choose the DC plan over the portable or traditional DB plan. We have two major findings. First, despite the projections by SURS at the start of the program that a majority of new employees would actively select the SMP or portable plan, in fact the majority of new employees never make any active pension choice, and thus are defaulted in to the traditional plan. After the initial publicity surrounding the introduction of plan choice started to fade, the proportion of new employees not making a choice, and hence defaulting into the traditional plan, increased from 43 percent in 1999 to roughly three-fifths over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Second, we find that approximately 15 percent of new employees choose the SelfManaged Plan, despite the fact that the SMP is likely an inferior choice due to plan parameters that make it less generous than the Portable plan under reasonable assumptions. Interestingly, we find that individuals are more likely than average to choose the SMP if they are more highly educated (as proxied by being an academic employee as opposed to staff, as well as being at a University as opposed to a community college), have higher earnings, are married, and work at an institution where a higher fraction of other employees also chose the SMP. We attribute the selection of the SMP to framing effects in how the plan choices are communicated to new employees.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the basic structure of the SURS system, including more details about each of the plan options and how the choices are made. Section 3 discusses the administrative data in more detail, including its strengths and limitations. In section 4, we outline our empirical methods and present some simple tabulations of plan choice. Section 5 reports more formal results. Section 6 concludes and sets forth several directions for subsequent research. Within these employers, the employees include university, college or campus administrators, faculty members, administrative and clerical staff, individuals in the employ of university police, and others. In general, an individual will participate as long as their position requires them to work "continuously for at least one academic term or 4 months, whichever is less, and … employment is not temporary, intermittent, or irregular … SURS participation ends on the date you retire or terminate employment with a SURS-covered employer." Eligibility does not extend to students regularly attending classes at a SURS-covered employer who are employed on a part-time or temporary basis for that employer, to J-1 or F-1 visa holders who have not yet established residency, or to current annuitants from SURS.
Social Security taxes are not withheld from SURS earnings, and SURS participants are not eligible for Social Security coverage based on their employment with a SURS covered employer. SURS withholds 8 percent of salary as an employee contribution to SURS. The State/employer contribution varies by plan, and will be described in more detail below.
Prior to 1998, all employees in the SURS system were covered by the traditional defined benefit (DB) system. In the mid-1990s, however, pressure began building on the State Legislature to offer a DC option to state employees. In 1997, the Illinois Legislature passed a law allowing participating employers to offer individuals a choice of three plans. The addition of a DC option was viewed as having two key benefits. First, it was believed that a DC plan would be more attractive to potential new employees. The SURS executive director at the time was quoted as saying "The legislation passed because universities were saying they needed it to attract people from other states." 2 The shift was also promoted as a way to impose fiscal discipline on the State Legislature. State Senator Peter Fitzgerald, a leading advocate of the switch, argued that the DC plan would force lawmakers to put the money up-front so that employees could invest it, rather than offering promises of future benefits that the Legislature had a history of underfunding.
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The next three sub-sections summarize the key features of each of the three pension options.
Traditional Benefit Package
This historical SURS retirement plan is the only one that was in place prior to 1998. As of the writing of this paper, the Traditional plan remains the default option for individuals who do not make an active plan designation within 6 months of their hire date (or specifically, the date that is received by SURS as the individual's certification of employment.) Employees contribute 8 percent of pay, which is the same contribution rate as in the other two options. Of this 8 percent, SURS reports that 6.5 percent is designated to fund the normal retirement benefit, 0.5 percent is designated to fund automatic annual increases in retirement benefits, and 1 percent is designated to fund survivor benefits, although it is not clear how closely these reported designations match actuarial costs. Because all SURS-covered workers are employees of the State of Illinois, the employer contribution to SURS is a general State obligation.
For participants in the Traditional plan, SURS documents state that "the State's share for a retirement annuity averages about 9.1 percent of the total earnings of all SURS participants in a Defined Benefit Plan. (pg 2). This figure, however, is only an average for those who retire from the system. If an individual leaves SURS employment and claims a refund of contributions (rather than leaving the money in the SURS system), they forfeit the employer contributions, and thus the State's share would be substantially less than 9.1 percent, and perhaps even negative, depending on asset returns (an individual refunding from the Traditional plan receives only their own contributions plus a 4.5 percent rate of interest Each of these approaches to calculating the benefit has numerous additional complexities that we do not expand on here in the interest of space. For example, there are special rules government a supplemental minimum annuity guarantee, reversionary annuities to provide a spouse or dependent with higher income than the usual survivor benefits, and an fourth formula that applies only to policy officers and firefighters.
For all employees, the benefit is calculated under all three methods (four, in the case of police and fire), and the individual receives the higher of the three benefit amounts. In recent years, the majority of retirees have received the highest level of benefits under the money purchase formula. The only additional restriction is that, regardless of method, benefits in retirement cannot exceed 80 percent of final average pay. Benefits are automatically increased by 3 percent every January 1. There are also generous survivor benefits both before and after retirement. In particular, the benefit that comes out of these calculations is automatically paid as a joint and 50% contingent survivor annuity. If a single individual retires under the Traditional plan, then in addition to receiving the calculated monthly benefit, he is entitled to a refund of 1/8 of his contributions plus interest.
The service credit is a key parameter in the calculation of one's benefits. In any academic year (from September 1 through August 31), an individual may earn no more than 1 year of service credit, and it is possible to earn fractional years of credit. A complex set of rules determines how service credits are affected by disability leave, sick leave, unused sick leave, prior service with other employers, military service, and other similar situations. A second key parameter is an individual's final average earnings (or "final rate of earnings." This is basically the four consecutive academic years of service in which the individual's earnings were the highest. Only "basic" compensation is included in this calculation, which excludes vacation, overtime and some types of summer employment. There are also limitations on the rate at which earnings are permitted to grow year-over-year as part of this calculation.
In short, the Traditional Benefit package is an extremely generous pension plan for those who retire from the system. The major downside of this plan, however, is that it is not very generous for those who leave the system early. Regardless of length of service, participants in the Traditional Benefit package who take a refund from the system upon terminating employment will receive their own contributions (equal to 8 percent of salary) plus a 4.5% interest rate. No employer/State contributions are refunded, even after the individual is vested.
In contrast to private sector DB plans, the SURS benefits are not insured by the PBGC, and it is worth noting that the State of Illinois has massively under-funded its share of the pension obligations. As of March 31, 2006, the State University Retirement System investment portfolio (which covers both the Traditional and the Portable plan options) was valued at nearly $14.5 billion, but faced liabilities of over $21 billion, for a funding ratio of only 68%. In actuality, the funding problem is worse than these official statistics indicated because the liabilities are discounted using a high discount rate that reflects the expected return on plan assets rather than using a riskless rate of interest. The degree of official underfunding is widely reported in the Illinois press, as well as in the regular participant newsletters sent out by SURS, and thus most participants are likely aware that there is political risk to their future benefits. This political risk is, however, substantially mitigated by the fact that Article XIII, Section5 of the Illinois Constitution states that "membership in any pension or retirement system of the State … shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." This "impairment clause," as it has come to be known, means that the Legislature cannot reduce the generosity of the SURS benefit without a constitutional amendment. Nonetheless, uncertainty about the ability of the State to make good on its future funding obligations may lead some individuals to prefer the SelfManaged Plan.
Portable Benefit Package
The portable benefit package is a modified version of the Traditional package. The first key differences is that if the person leaves the system early and takes a refund of their contributions, they receive a rate of interest that is higher than the 4.5% provided by the Traditional plan. Indeed, this
Effective Interest Rate (which is the same rate used to calculate retirement benefits under the Money Purchase option) has averaged over 8% for the past 20 years. If an individual has at least 5 years of service, and is thus vested, he/she also receives a full dollar-for-dollar match from the State. In short, any individual who departs SURS service and takes a refund rather than leaving the money in the SURS system, the portable plan is far more generous than the traditional plan.
The second key difference is that the benefits from the portable plan are not as generous as the traditional plan if the individual retires from the system. In particular, for participants in the traditional plan, the monthly benefit amount is paid as a joint and survivor annuity. Single individuals under the traditional plan can take 1/8 of their contributions plus interest as a lump-sum at retirement in lieu of the survivor benefits. In contrast, under the portable plan, the retirement benefit is a paid as a single life annuity, and married individuals must accept an actuarial reduction to convert it to a joint and survivor annuity.
There are other differences as well. For example, whereas participants in the Traditional plan are required to annuitize their assets, Portable plan participants do have the option to take a lump-sum at retirement. Doing so, however, comes at the high cost of losing eligibility for retiree health benefits.
Self-Managed Plan (SMP)
The SMP is an entirely participant-directed defined contribution plan that invests a total of 14.6% of salary (8% employee and 6.6% employer) into retirement accounts. Participants are able to choose from a variety of mutual funds and annuity contracts from TIAA-CREF and Fidelity. Upon full vesting after 5 years of service, the individual is entitled to a 100% refund of both employer and employee contributions plus any investment gains or losses. Upon retirement, the individual is able to choose from a wide range of annuities (e.g., joint and survivor with 50%, 75% or 100% survivor benefits, and the option of 10, 15, and 20 year period certain guarantees) or a lump-sum. As with the Portable plan, however, retirees must annuitize their full account balance in order to be eligible for retiree health benefits from the State of Illinois.
All of the educational information provided by SURS, including the instructional videos, the program guides and online information, guides new SURS participants through the plan choice by focusing on the distinction between DB and DC plans. A reasonable inference from this material, even by financially sophisticated employees, is that the Traditional Benefit Package is the best choice for individuals who expect to retire from SURS covered employment, while the SMP option is a good choice for highly mobile employees (such as new, untenured faculty members) who value choice and are comfortable making their own investment decisions. The Portable plan is largely presented as a modified version of the DB. Indeed, much of the material is structured so as to guide individuals down the DB vs. DC path first, and then discuss the Portable vs. Traditional distinction only after one has gone down the DB path. Thus, many employees may be left with the general impression that the Portable plan lies somewhere between the Traditional and the SMP on nearly all dimensions.
A much more careful examination, however, suggests that the SMP is quite likely an inferior choice, relative to the Portable plan, for nearly all employees, regardless of their expected employment longevity with a SURS employer. To understand its inferiority, it is useful to consider the benefits from these two options for individuals at different points in their careers.
First, consider an employee who leaves SURS employment and takes a lump-sum refund from the system. If the leave service prior to vesting (i.e., individuals with less than 5 years of service), the differences are small. In both cases, individuals receive their own 8% contributions. In the portable plan, the individual receives the SURS rate of interest, while in the SMP, they receive actual investment returns. After vesting, however, the differences are much larger. Under the portable plan, the individual also receives a full 8% match from the State, while in the SMP, the individual only receives 6.6%. Thus, for the SMP to make financial sense, the individual must expect to receive average investment returns that are sufficient not just to beat the very high rate of interest credited by SURS to the portable plan (which has averaged 8-9% nominal for the past 20 years), but they also must earn enough extra return to make-up the 1.4% of salary shortfall in the State contribution rate. Simple calculations suggest that SMP participants must expect annual rates of return in the 9-12% range, depending on time horizon, in order for the SMP to be a sensible choice.
Second, consider an employee who retires from SURS. In this case, the employee receives the higher of the methods of benefit calculation discussed above. Just focusing on the money purchase option, it is worth noting that the State contribution is 8 percent, versus only 6.6 percent for the SMP. In addition to having a higher contribution rate, the effective interest rate credited to participants for purposes of the money purchase calculation has remained in a very narrow and generous band of 8-9%
for the past two decades. Thus, the rate of return that an individual must receive on their SMP contributions in order for the SMP to generate a higher account balance must exceed 8-9% plus enough extra return to offset the lower State contribution rate. To have a reasonable chance of beating a this benchmark, investors would have to allocate a very high share of their portfolio to equity, which would, of course, subject them to significant downside risk. Furthermore, even if the Effective Interest Rate were to decline in the future, the General Formula provides a benefit floor equal to 2.2% of final average salary for each year of service.
It may be surprising, therefore, that anyone chooses the SMP. However, many of the differences just described, such as the difference in the match and the magnitude of the Effective Interest Rate, are not easily discernable from the material provided by SURS. Further, as previously mentioned, the framing of the pension plan choice as first a decision between DB and DC, as opposed to a direct comparison of all three options simultaneously, may also help explain participation in the SMP. The SURS manual explicitly cites as a disadvantage of a DB plan that "members with short service, or those who expect to leave their job soon, will not earn a large benefit" while a key advantage of a DC plan is that "members can transfer balances to other defined contribution plans should they change employers" (SURS, The
Power of Choice, p. 5). However, while the Portable plan is classified as a DB-type plan, members with short service are treated essentially the same under the SMP and Portable plan options, with the accumulated balances of both allowed to be transferred to another plan if the worker changes employers (including employer contributions if vesting has occurred).
In addition to a simple lack of understanding of key plan parameters, there are other reasons that individuals may prefer the SMP option, despite its apparent financial disadvantages. These include concerns about political risk in the Traditional and Portable plans, arising from the fact that the State of Illinois has consistently under-funded the plans. While there is a State constitutional guarantee against the impairment of benefits for current state pension plan participants, the substantial under-funding of the plans may lead some participants to question the long-term ability of the State to make good on its pension promises. In contrast, the State contributions to the SMP are made immediately. Individuals may also have overly-optimistic beliefs about future equity market returns that lead them to believe that their SMP investments can outperform the SURS rate of interest. Individuals may also simply place a high value on the ability to choose their investment portfolio. While we are not able to distinguish among these various reasons in the current administrative data, we are planning to address these issues in followon work using a survey of SURS participants.
Finally, another difference between the SMP and the other two plans (Portable and Traditional), is that employer contributions commence after the employee formally selects the SMP option and not when employment starts, whereas employer contributions are made retroactively back to the employment date in the Portable and Traditional plans. Thus, a four-month lag between the start of employment and selecting a retirement plan will result in the worker losing four months of employer contributions in the SMP plan, but will result in no loss of employer contributions in the other two plans. This provides a financial incentive to make a quick decision if one is considering the SMP.
Data
The State University Retirement System of Illinois has provided us with a rich data containing administrative records for the entire population of workers who have started working for a SURS covered employer subsequent to that employer's offering of plan choice. SURS provided us with data on both a) employees who had already been covered by SURS at the point in time at which their employer first began offering choice and b) new employees who have joined the system since choice was first offered.
We are confident that the new employee data is complete, i.e., that we observe individuals who were given a choice, even if they subsequently left the system, became disabled or died. With the pre-existing employee data, however, we are not confident that we have a complete set of records of individuals who subsequently left the system. Therefore, we will focus our analysis on the "new employee" sample, where there are no concerns about sample selection. Fortunately, this is also the more interesting population to examine because their choice is not "contaminated" by the fact that they had significant prior service under the Traditional plan. For pre-existing employees who switched to the SMP at the time the new plans were initially adopted, they had to forfeit all prior employer contributions, which should have strongly tilted the decision against the SMP (although interestingly, a non-trivial number of individuals made this choice).
As such, our analysis focuses on those individuals that began service with a SURS covered employer in 1999 or after. While most employers adopted the new choices at some point during the 1998 calendar year, we only know the year in which an employee began service with a SURS covered employer, and not the month, we are unable to determine which employees joining the system in 1998 joined the employer after adoption of the new plan options. By focusing on the 1999 or after sample, we are confident that we are examining the "post-choice" cohorts.
The universe of individuals beginning employment in 1999 or after (through 2004) consists of approximately 63,000 observations. However, SURS was unable to provide complete earnings records for the entire sample, and thus the sample size drops to just over 45,000 when we condition on observing earnings.
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In Table 1 , we report the fraction of the population that makes each plan choice in each year of our 1999-2004 sample. Over the entire sample period, we see that slightly under half the sample (44%) 4 Our measure of earnings is the reported earnings in the second year of employment. While we would have liked to use the respondent's first year of earnings, we were given actual rather than annualized earnings during the first year. Thus, for many individuals who worked only part of the year, we observe only a fraction of their annual salary. We are unable to annualize the data because SURS did not provide us with the month that a person started employment. In addition to dropping observations that are missing earnings, we have experimented with several other approaches (including a dummy variable for missing along with its interaction with earnings, imputing each missing value with a predicted value, etc.) and found that our coefficient estimates were not terribly sensitive, which is not surprising given that the reason earnings is missing is not systematically correlated with plan choice. This is often called an "ignorable case" of missing data in the econometrics literature.
made an active pension selection, while the majority (56%) were defaulted into the Traditional Benefits
Package. The fact that the default option craws such a large number of individuals could reflect either the power of the default itself, as one would expect given the evidence in this area (e.g., Shea, 2001, and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2001) , or it could simply reflect that a large number of individuals concluded that the Traditional plan was the best choice and therefore just allowed SURS to default them into it. Another 10% of participants made an active choice into the Traditional plan, bringing the total number of participants in the Traditional Plan to nearly two-thirds of the sample.
Approximately 15% of the sample chose the SMP while just under 19% chose the Portable package.
A striking feature of the data is that the fraction of individuals accepting the default option has grown steadily over time, from 43% in 1999 to around 58% in 2001, where it has remained relative stable since. This time series pattern perhaps reflects the flurry of local press attention paid during the introduction of plan choice, which quickly subsided.
The fraction choosing the SMP also shows substantial changes over time. range over the same period.
In Table 2 , we report summary statistics for a number of key variables. We first report classifications by occupation (academic, staff, or police) interacted whether the individual works for a university, community college, or some other employer type. The single largest group, comprising just under one-third of the sample, are academic employees at state universities. Staff members at universities and academics at community colleges each contribute another 22-23% of the sample, while community college staff comprise 15% of the sample. Police account for less then 1% of the sample. Approximately 8% of the sample is employed by a state agency other than a university or community college.
Interestingly, only two-thirds of our sample is still considered an "active" SURS participant, meaning that they are still employed by a SURS covered employer and thus making contributions. Most of the rest left SURS employment, while a trivial fraction of the sample had died or retired. Individuals who leave SURS service after 5 years are considered vested, and thus eligible to receive State contributions along with their own if they choose the Portable of the SMP plan, and thus we will control for this in our analysis.
A majority of new employees (57%) are women, and 59% of our sample is married. Average earnings in the sample are only $24,100 per year, but this figure includes part-time employees (which are over one-quarter of our sample). If we condition the sample on being considered a full-time employee, the average earnings are roughly $43,000 for an academic, $35,000 for a police officer, and $28,000 for staff. In addition to these covariates, we also know information about the individual's three-digit zip code and their campus, which we will use in some of our specifications below.
While our is quite rich in many respects, it has the usual limitation of administrative data in that we do not know many potentially relevant demographic characteristics, such as health status, or non-SURS financial resources such as wealth, spousal earnings, or non-SURS earnings.
Unconditional Tabulations and Empirical Methods
When Table 3 displays the retirement plan choices made across various groups based on occupation, plan status, and demographics. These unconditional tabulations suggest that academics at universities are more than twice as likely to enroll in the SMP (the DC plan) and are significantly less likely to actively select or be defaulted in to the Traditional (DB) plan than are other employees. Those employees that left their job before vesting (i.e., in less than five years) are more apt to have made no pension choice and thus be defaulted into the traditional plan ex ante than are employees who ended up staying with their employer or stayed long enough to be vested. This could reflect that, for this group of short-tenured workers, the pension choice is not viewed as being of much importance (i.e., differences in plan benefits are much more striking after vesting).
To more formally analyze these plan choices and their determinants, we follow two complementary approaches. First, we analyze a series of linear probability models to provide simple to interpret point estimates (marginal effects from Probit models are similar). We define the dependent variable y i in six different ways: (i) chose SMP, (ii) chose Portable, (iii) chose or defaulted into Traditional, (iv) made any "active" choice (vs. defaulting), (v) actively chose traditional, conditional on being in traditional, and (vi) chose traditional, conditional on making an active choice. These will be explained in more detail below. We include a full set of control variables.
A second approach is to use a multinomial logit model, in recognition of the fact that the individual is choosing from among four distinct outcomes that do not have a natural ordering. In the multinomial logit model, we estimate a set of coefficients β
, β 3(trad) , and β 4(default) corresponding to each outcome category, such that the probability of an individual choosing SMP is:
( ) To identify a multinomial model, it is standard to select on set of coefficients equal to zero, so that the remaining set of coefficients measures the change relative to the base group. In our specifications, we will use as our base group those individuals who failed to make an active choice and thus defaulted into the Traditional plan (y=4), and thus set β 4(default) =0.
Thus, the relative probability of choosing the SMP to defaulting into the Traditional plan is: Thus, the way to interpret the coefficients is that the exponentiated value of a coefficient is the relative risk ratio for a one unit change in the corresponding variable, where the risk is being measured is the "risk" of choosing SMP relative to taking the default option. The elements of X are the same as in the linear probability models. In our tables, we will report the relative risk ratios for ease of interpretation. Table 4 reports results from six linear probability models. We begin in columns 1, 2, and 3 with an analysis of who chooses the SMP, Portable, and Traditional (whether by active choice or default) plans, respectively. Since an individual will ultimately be in one of these three plans, and being in one plan means not being in the other two, the coefficients across the three columns will add up to zero (within rounding). Consistent with the simple tabulations presented in Table 3 , the results clearly indicate strong differences by occupation (which, in this setting, is a good proxy for educational attainment and perhaps financial sophistication). When one accounts for all of the interaction terms, we find that, relative to an academic at a university, staff members at a university are 9.7 percentage points less likely to choose the SMP, academics at a community college are 3.6 percentage points less likely to choose the SMP, and staff members at a community college are 6.9 percentage points less likely to choose the SMP.
Results on Plan Choice

Who Chooses the SMP, Portable, and Traditional?
These effects are quite large given the baseline SMP participation rate of only 15%. Relative to other occupation groups, academics at universities are much less likely to be enrolled in the Traditional plan. This is very much consistent with many academics' uncertainty surrounding their long-term future at a university (i.e., the tenure decision) when these retirement plan decisions are made (recall the Traditional plan is particularly attractive for employees likely to have a long stay with their employer). For example, staff at a university are 13 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in the Traditional Plan than are academics (with the difference much more muted when one focuses on staff and academics at community colleges).
Benefits for police officers under the portable and traditional plans are more generous than those for other employees due to the existence of a fourth option for calculating benefits which applies only to police and fire employees. Consistent with this, police officers at a University are 23.1 percentage points less like to participate in the SMP, while police officers at a community college are 10.2 percentage points less likely to do so.
There is evidence that there is a correlation between the ex post employment duration and the ex ante retirement plan choices. For example, those individuals that ended up leaving the firm before vesting were more likely to enroll in the Traditional plan (the default option). For a worker that leaves SURS before vesting, the choice of retirement plan has little economic consequence. However, workers that ex post left the firm, but with sufficient tenure to obtain vesting, were much less likely to have chosen the Traditional Plan. Recall that workers who leave their SURS employer after vesting and opt for a refund of their retirement plan balance receive both employee and employer contributions under the SMP or Portable plans, but relinquish employer contributions under the Traditional plan. Thus, assuming some foresight in employment duration, the coefficients on the "left with vesting" and "left without vesting" variables are sensible given the pension plan rules in place.
Higher income workers are more likely to enroll in the SMP or Portable plans, at the expense of enrollment in the Traditional plan-a $10,000 increase in earnings corresponds to a nearly 3 percentage point increase in the probability of choosing the SMP, a 0.7 percentage point increase in the probability of choosing Portable, and a 3.6 percentage point decline in enrollment in the Traditional plan. To the extent that income may proxy for greater financial sophistication (similar to being an academic at a university), greater financial sophistication is associated with a higher likelihood of selecting the DC plan. Females are more likely to pick the Portable plan than males and married individuals are more likely to pick the SMP than single. Both younger and older individuals seem less likely to select the SMP and are instead more apt to enroll in the Traditional plan (but perhaps for different reasons given that the Traditional is also the default option).
6 As expected, individuals with prior service in another system with reciprocity are more likely to be enrolled in the Traditional plan.
We also observe how the plan choice varies over time, holding fixed other characteristics. The time series trends presented in Table 4 are very similar to the unconditional trends documented in Table 1 .
We find that SMP participation rates Finally, "Percent on campus" indicates what fraction of the campus population chose the same option as the individual. This is defined by taking the total number of employees on that campus at the time the individual began employment who chose the SMP option, for example, and dividing it by the total number of campus employees (excluding individual i). We find a strong positive relation for all the pension plan decisions, indicating the possibility of either peer effects (e.g., an individual is more likely to choose the SMP if others on the campus also did so), "human resources" effects (e.g., the H.R. officer
gives common advice to all new employees on that campus), or more generally sorting of individuals across campuses based on unobserved characteristics (to the econometrician) that are correlated with pension plan choice.
In unreported results, we further explore peer effects. In the spirit of Saez (2002, 2003) , we also include the percent of academics making a particular choice and the percent of staff making a choice. We then interact these two campus-wide measures with whether the individual is an academic or staff. This enables us to test whether academics are more influenced by the decisions of fellow academics as opposed to staff, and vice versa. We find, across all of the pension choices, that the choice of a given academic is highly correlated with that of other academics on campus, but is uncorrelated with that of staff on campus, with the reverse also holding.
To summarize, we find that the SMP (DC plan) is most likely to be chosen by individuals who are highly educated (e.g., university academics) and have higher incomes, while the Traditional plan (DB plan) is most likely to be chosen by less educated individuals with lower incomes.
In essence, the SMP is disproportionately chosen by the very group that one would likely expect to be the most financially 6 The omitted age group in the regression is 35-39.
sophisticated. It is ironic, that, as explained in section 2 above, a close examination of this plan suggests that it is inferior to the Portable plan in most states of the world. While we plan to do more research on this subject, our initial hypothesis is that most participants are making a more general "DB vs.
DC" decision, and that the SMP may indeed be rationally preferable to the Traditional plan for most of these employees. The failure to choose the Portable plan instead, however, is due to the inadequate information disclosure by SURS that leads to an incomplete understanding of why the SMP is disadvantaged in comparison to the Portable plan.
Active vs. Passive Choice
The results in column 3 combine individuals who actively chose the Traditional plan and those who were defaulted into it. This distinction is worth further consideration, as these may represent two very different populations. In column 4, we use as our dependent variable whether the individual simply made any active choice (including SMP, portable, or traditional) as opposed to passively accepting the default. The complement of this dependent variable is defaulting into the Traditional option (and thus the coefficients from a "default" regression will simply be the negative of those displayed in column 4).
Consistent with earlier results, we find that more educated individuals (academics, university employees), and those with higher earnings are more likely to make an active plan choice, as are women, and married individuals. As noted earlier, the overall fraction of active decision making declined substantially over the period, falling by 15 percentage points between 1999 and 2003.
In columns 5 and 6, we examine individuals who made an active choice to go with the Traditional plan, even though an active choice was not necessary to achieve the Traditional plan outcome. In column 5, we limit the sample to those in the Traditional plan, and are thus analyzing active vs. passive Traditional plan participants. We can clearly reject that these two groups are the same. Conditional on ending up in the Traditional plan, it is actually community college employees and staff members who are most likely to have actively made this choice. Higher earners, women and married individuals are also more likely to have made this active choice, while younger people are more likely to have ended up in the Traditional plan by default. In sum, the population of defaulters is "different" both from the general population of those that made an active pension choice as well as hose that actively selected the same plan as the default option (i.e., the Traditional plan).
In column 6 we explore how those who actively chose the Traditional plan differ from other individuals who made active choices (dropping those who defaulted). The patterns are largely as expected based on earlier results.
Campus/Employer Fixed Effects
As stated earlier, the framing of the pension plan choice as a discussion of DB vs. DC, as opposed to simultaneously comparing all three plans (SMP, Portable, and Traditional) may obfuscate the benefits of the Portable plan (particularly relative to the SMP). Of all the more than 60 campuses/employers covered by the State University Retirement System (SURS), one would expect/hope that the employees of SURS itself, the organization that makes and administers the pension plan rules, would be best informed of the pros and cons of all three retirement plans. Focusing on employers with at least 25 new hires over the period 1999-2004 (there are a handful of employers with just a couple new hires), we find that 49% of employees of SURS pick the Portable plan, by far the largest of any employer This compares to only 19% for the whole sample and 27% for the next highest employer. Only 5% of SURS employees select the SMP, the 4 th lowest among all employers, compared to 15% for the whole sample. Also, 90% of SURS employees make an active choice (i.e., only 10% default into a choice), which is again the highest proportion by far across the employers covered by SURS. This suggests that there may be important employer-specific effects on retirement plan decisions.
More formally, in specifications not reported, we have further included employer indicator variables in our regression specifications. While we are no longer able to identify some of our campuswide variables in these specifications (such as community college and its interactions, or the % choosing the same option) because of a very little time series variation in these variables, we do find that the campus variables are jointly significant, with a p-value of 0.000, even in a regression that already controls for 3-digit zip codes. This clearly suggests that there are strong campus effects, although it does not allow us to definitively distinguish whether it is driven by peer effects, human resource effects, or sorting effects. 
Multinomial Logit Results
A limitation of the OLS specification is that they limit us to examining one choice at a time. In reality, individuals can choose from the entire menu of actions upon joining a SURS covered employer. Specifically, there are four distinct actions an individual can take, as noted earlier.
In Table 5 , we introduce a multinomial logit specification to examine this choice. By treating the default option as our base category, we report the relative risk ratio of our key co-variates for each of the other three possible outcomes. In interpreting the coefficients, recall that what matters is whether the risk ratio is greater than or less than 1.0. For example, the relative risk ratio of 0.744 for community college in column 1 means that an employee of a community college is only 74.4% as likely to choose the SMP over the Traditional plan than is an employee of a University. Note that unlike the earlier table, all of the columns in Table 4 are from the same regression. Column 1 reports the risk ratio for the SMP vs. the default option, column 2 for Portable vs. the default option, and column 3 for actively choosing the Traditional plan vs. accepting the default option. This analysis raises fascinating questions as to why individuals who, by most observables, appear to be highly capable individuals make what appear to be sub-optimal choices. We speculate that there are at least four reasons why they may do so. First, participants may simply have inadequate information with which to make the best choice. In the opinion of the authors, the educational material provided by SURS does a poor job of facilitating comparisons between the self-managed plan and the portable benefits package and may lead many employees to mistakenly believe that the self-managed plan is the most generous plan for individuals who leave SURS employment early in their career. Second, individuals may understand the rules, but may simply suffer from overconfidence in their investment abilities and/or have unrealistically high expectations about future risk-adjusted equity market returns.
Third, individuals may have either rational or irrational beliefs about the degree of political risk in the traditional or portable benefit plans, arising due to the chronic under-funding problem facing the SURS system. Fourth, individuals may simply place a very high value on choice for its own sake. In future research, we intend to explore these alternative hypotheses using a survey of current SURS participants. 20,049 ¹ Standard Errors in Parentheses; ***, **, * Significant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively 
